On August 22, 2026, a Chinese woman in her 40s arrived at Milan Malpensa Airport with her eight-year-old daughter. Originally from Zhejiang Province, she had held a long-term European Union residence permit, allowing her to live in Italy. But instead of being admitted into the country, she was stopped by border police, stripped of her residence status, and ordered to return to China. Italian authorities also imposed a 15-year ban on her return.
According to the Italian newspaper Il Foglio, the woman had been monitoring a Chinese dissident living in Italy on behalf of others in exchange for money. Her deportation was part of a widening Italian crackdown on the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) overseas surveillance activities. Subsequent investigations have revealed a disturbing picture of how individuals within overseas Chinese communities can be recruited to track and intimidate dissidents, sometimes for as little as €100 (slightly more than US$100) a day, while exposing themselves to potentially devastating consequences.
A 15-year ban from Italy
The woman and her daughter were escorted onto a flight to Shenzhen, China, before continuing to Hangzhou. Her name was entered into the Schengen Information System (SIS), which allows European authorities to share information about individuals subject to immigration and security measures.
The decision was not an ordinary immigration matter. According to Il Foglio, Italy’s Ministry of the Interior ordered her expulsion on national security grounds and revoked her EU long-term residence permit. Investigators from DIGOS, the Italian police division responsible for investigating politically motivated crimes and threats to national security, had uncovered her involvement in surveillance activities directed against a Chinese national critical of Beijing.
The newspaper did not identify the woman or disclose how much she had been paid. Nevertheless, the punishment was severe. A woman who had possessed the legal right to reside in Italy was now barred from returning for 15 years, and her daughter accompanied her back to China.
The case illustrates the personal risks of participating in activities associated with foreign political repression. What might be presented to an overseas Chinese resident as a “minor assignment” or an “opportunity to earn extra money” can carry consequences under the laws of the country where the activity takes place. Unlike in mainland China, where the CCP’s security apparatus operates with extensive powers and little independent oversight, individuals conducting unauthorized surveillance on behalf of a foreign government may face serious consequences in a country governed by the rule of law.
The blogger who became a target of Beijing
The broader Italian investigation centers on Li Ying, the Chinese blogger known as “Teacher Li Is Not Your Teacher” on X, formerly Twitter. Li has lived in Italy since 2015 and has become one of the most influential independent sources of information about events inside China.
His prominence grew during the White Paper Movement in late 2022, when protesters across China and abroad held up blank sheets of paper to protest the country’s strict COVID-19 restrictions and pervasive censorship. As Chinese authorities worked to suppress information about the demonstrations, Li’s social media account became a vital channel for videos, photographs, and eyewitness reports that could not circulate freely inside China.
Since then, his account has continued publishing information about grassroots protests, unfinished housing projects, financial scandals, and other politically sensitive events. By November 2026, Li had approximately 2.2 million followers, many of whom relied on his reporting for information unavailable through China’s state-controlled media.
For the CCP, such an independent information network poses a serious challenge to its ability to control public discussion. Information that authorities attempt to erase from Chinese platforms can still reach millions of readers through Li’s account.
Yet living in Italy has not protected him from intimidation.
According to Reuters, Li and his family have endured years of surveillance, harassment, and threats. The pressure has included attempts to discover his whereabouts, threats of violence, and intimidation directed at people connected to him in China.
Italian investigators uncover an extensive surveillance network
The investigation gathered momentum in October 2024, when Li recorded a man through his apartment door’s peephole spray-painting a threatening message near his residence in Turin. The incident helped investigators uncover what prosecutors describe as an organized campaign to monitor and intimidate him.
The surveillance extended far beyond occasional photographs or threatening online messages. Suspects allegedly visited residences where Li was believed to be living, photographed entrances, monitored buildings from nearby cafés, searched garbage bins, and questioned neighbors about his movements. One suspect reportedly accumulated more than 4,000 photographs and 35 videos connected to the surveillance operations.
Li also received death threats through social media and email, including messages accompanied by photographs of firearms and other weapons. Investigators documented the publication of his personal information online and pressure directed at his family and acquaintances in China.
The relentless harassment forced Li to repeatedly change residences between Milan and Turin. Even in a democratic country thousands of miles from Beijing, he found himself adjusting his daily life to avoid being located by people apparently determined to silence him.
The investigation uncovered connections that prosecutors believe extended to the Chinese security apparatus.
On October 23, 2026, Milan prosecutors notified 10 suspects — eight Chinese nationals and two Italian citizens — that their investigation had concluded, giving them an opportunity to respond before prosecutors decided whether to proceed toward trial.
According to documents examined by Reuters, two suspected organizers are accused of acting on behalf of Chinese police while maintaining contact with Chinese diplomatic personnel and members of the CCP’s United Front Work Department. The department oversees the Party’s efforts to influence groups outside its direct organization, including overseas Chinese communities.
Four suspects face accusations of participating in a criminal organization intended to prevent Chinese dissidents from sharing information and exercising their freedom of expression. The charge carries a potential prison sentence of up to seven years under Italian law.
How €100 can become part of an intelligence operation
Perhaps one of the most revealing aspects of the investigation is how little money was allegedly needed to recruit someone to help locate a dissident.
According to the prosecution documents reviewed by Reuters, one suspect offered another person €100 per day to assist in finding Li Ying. The arrangement illustrates a method of gathering intelligence that relies on ordinary individuals performing tasks that might initially appear harmless.
Italian public broadcaster Rai News reported that an attempted recruitment took place through WeChat, the messaging application widely used by Chinese communities. The prospective recruit was reportedly told that Li was difficult to locate and owed money. Photographs and other identifying details were provided to facilitate the search, along with an offer of approximately €100 per day.
Afterward, the person was instructed to delete the conversations, apparently to avoid leaving evidence of the exchange.
This approach reduces the need for professional intelligence operatives to carry out every aspect of an overseas surveillance campaign. Instead, intermediaries can draw on personal relationships, hometown associations, business contacts, and social networks to recruit people already familiar with the local environment.
What appears to be a simple task — photographing an apartment entrance, recording someone’s movements, or identifying the people a person meets — can become valuable intelligence when combined with information collected by others.
The relatively small payment illustrates how cheaply surveillance activities can be outsourced to individuals who may not fully appreciate the risks involved. What begins as a seemingly harmless opportunity to earn extra money can have life-altering consequences when the assignment involves monitoring someone targeted by a foreign government.
Italy takes a harder line against transnational repression
Italy’s actions did not begin with the August deportation.
In March 2026, Italian authorities issued expulsion orders for eight Chinese nationals suspected of participating in surveillance and harassment directed at Chinese dissidents. The measures followed years of investigations into activities associated with Beijing’s overseas repression efforts.
According to Safeguard Defenders, a human rights organization that has extensively documented China’s overseas policing activities, the expulsions represented a significant response to the CCP’s attempts to intimidate critics living on Italian soil.
Italy had previously attracted international attention for its cooperation with Beijing, including its participation in China’s Belt and Road Initiative and reports concerning Chinese overseas police service centers. Investigations by Safeguard Defenders identified Italy as an important location for such operations in Europe.
These overseas networks have raised concerns because some purported community service organizations have been linked to efforts to monitor Chinese nationals, gather information, and pressure individuals to comply with demands from authorities in China.
Not every overseas Chinese association is involved in such activities, and legitimate organizations provide important support to immigrant communities. The concern arises when people exploit those networks to conduct surveillance or intimidation on behalf of a foreign security apparatus.
The latest Italian investigation shows how these activities can overlap with otherwise ordinary community relationships.
According to prosecutors, some suspects held senior positions in Chinese community and business associations connected to Fujian Province. Investigators believe these connections helped facilitate the recruitment of informants and the collection of information about dissidents.
Italy’s response also reflects a broader recognition that transnational repression is not simply a dispute between the Chinese government and its critics. When agents or intermediaries operating within another country attempt to silence lawful residents through intimidation and surveillance, they challenge that country’s sovereignty and legal protections.
The criminal allegations against the 10 suspects have not been resolved by a court, and those accused remain entitled to defend themselves. Nevertheless, the evidence described by investigators provides a disturbing account of the methods allegedly employed to suppress criticism of Beijing beyond China’s borders.
The personal cost of serving an authoritarian regime
The Italian cases expose a troubling imbalance between those who direct overseas repression and those who carry it out.
Senior officials and organizers may remain far removed from the surveillance itself, while individuals recruited through community networks take the immediate risks. They are the ones who appear near a dissident’s home, photograph private residences, follow people through city streets, or communicate with potential targets.
When such operations come under investigation, those carrying out the assignments may find themselves facing immigration penalties, criminal charges, or the loss of the lives they have established abroad.
The woman deported from Milan offers a particularly striking example. Whatever her motives or the amount she was paid, Italian authorities determined that her involvement in surveillance on behalf of others justified revoking her residence permit and barring her from returning for 15 years.
That outcome raises a fundamental question: What protection can someone expect from an authoritarian government after becoming entangled in its overseas intelligence activities and attracting the attention of foreign law enforcement?
There is no public evidence establishing what assistance, if any, the woman received after returning to China. But her deportation demonstrates that those who participate in such activities may bear serious personal consequences, even when their role appears minor compared with that of the people directing the operation.
The CCP’s overseas repression efforts depend in part on persuading individuals that serving the Party’s political interests is an act of patriotism. Yet loyalty to a government does not exempt anyone from the laws of the country where they reside. Nor does a promise of payment transform surveillance and intimidation into legitimate community service.
For Chinese dissidents such as Li Ying, the Italian investigations offer hope that the protections of a democratic society can extend beyond promises on paper. The right to speak freely means little if those exercising it must constantly fear being followed, threatened, or forced from their homes.
For overseas Chinese residents tempted to assist in political surveillance, the warning is equally important. A task presented as a favor to the motherland, or an easy way to earn €100, may ultimately serve the interests of a regime that bears little of the personal risk.
The 15-year ban imposed on the woman deported from Milan is a reminder of how severe those consequences can become. While those who organize transnational repression may remain safely beyond the reach of Italian authorities, the people carrying out their instructions can lose the freedom and security they sought by making a life abroad.
Those who mistake serving the CCP for serving their country may discover that their loyalty means little to the Party once they become a liability.
Translated by Chua BC
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